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Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent 
Nancy Kim* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose a purchaser wishes to buy a vacation home using the 
Internet.  She desires a house in the country where she can escape the 
sounds and stresses of the city.  On the basis of pictures posted on a 
website, she enters into an agreement to purchase a house that looks like 
an idyllic country home.  During inspection, she discovers a noisy, 
nearby road.  The house looks exactly as it does on the website, but the 
posted pictures failed to capture the surrounding environment.  The 
purchaser imagined her mornings would be filled with the sounds of 
chirping birds, not blaring car horns.  The noise from the road would not 
be unbearable to the average homebuyer, but it undermines the 
purchasers reason for buying the house.  Could our purchaser avoid the 
transaction?  Should she be allowed to? 
Contract law requires that in order for promises to be legally 
enforceable, they must be supported by consideration.1  A corollary, 
often referred to as the bargain principle, provides that bargains will be 
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 1. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 8 (7th ed. 2001).  
While few scholars question that bargains supported by consideration are enforceable (absent 
available contract defenses, of course), many scholars dispute whether consideration is still a 
relevant or necessary requirement for enforcement of a promise.  See id. at 89.  In other words, 
while the existence of consideration may establish an enforceable promise, the absence of 
consideration should not necessarily preclude enforcement.  For a discussion of the relevance of the 
gatekeeping function of consideration, see Mark B. Wessman, Should We Fire the Gatekeeper?  
An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=958789
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enforced according to their terms.2  Stated another way, as long as there 
is a bargained-for exchange of a legal detriment (or conferral of a legal 
benefit), courts should not consider the adequacy of consideration.  There 
are, however, situations where the parties have entered into a bargain and 
then sought either to avoid enforcement or to reform the contract terms.  
A party seeking avoidance or reformation must prove one or more of 
several established defenses to enforcement.3  The most common 
contract defenses are duress, unconscionability, incapacity, fraud, and the 
basic assumption defenses4 of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, 
impossibility, frustration of purpose and commercial impracticability.5  
In this Article, I limit my discussion to basic assumption defenses.  
Several prevailing rationales explain why a party should be allowed to 
escape contractual liability despite the sufficiency of consideration where 
there has been a failure of a basic assumption material to the transaction.  
No single rationale or principle, however, unifies all basic assumption 
defenses.  Several commentators have noted that similar fact patterns 
applying a given doctrine often yield inconsistent results.6  Parties 
employment of these defenses, and courts analyses of them, is often 
confusing and inaccurate.7 
                                                     
 2. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 741 (1982).  Eisenberg argues that in certain cases, such as those involving exploitation or 
unfair persuasion, limits on the bargain principle are justified.  Id. at 74886. 
 3. In this Article, I use the term contract defenses to refer to the ways that a party to an 
agreement can avoid its obligations despite the existence of mutual assent and valid consideration.  
Contract defenses are thus used to demonstrate that a particular bargain was a voidable contract.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 7 (1981) (A voidable contract is one where one or more 
parties have the power, by a manifestation of election to do so, to avoid the legal relations created by 
the contract, or by ratification of the contract to extinguish the power of avoidance.). 
 4. Basic assumption defenses are discussed in greater detail in Part III. 
 5. Nondisclosure is an issue that is relevant to certain defenses, such as mistake and fraud, but 
this Article does not treat it as a stand-alone defense. 
 6. See, e.g., James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 
AM. J. COMP. L. 513, 51314 (2004) ([T]he attempt to explain which contracts should be enforced 
in terms of whether their performance is possible or not has been a failure.); Andrew Kull, Mistake, 
Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 3 (1991) 
(observing that judges and writers continue to defer to a supposed distinction between the doctrines 
[of mistake and frustration] but that such a distinction is without a difference). 
 7. See discussion infra Part III.  The variety of ways in which leading contract scholars have 
categorized contract defenses underscores the need for a unified framework.  For example, Calamari 
and Perillo discuss infancy and mental infirmity in a chapter titled Capacity of Parties, and duress, 
undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake and unconscionability in a chapter titled Avoidance or 
Reformation for Misconduct or Mistake.  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS vii (5th ed. 2003).  Farnsworth discusses some defenses (such as infancy, insanity, 
duress, and unconscionability) in a chapter titled Policing the Agreement, while the defenses of 
mistake, impracticability and frustration of purpose are discussed in the chapter Failure of a Basic 
Assumption: Mistake, Impracticability, and Frustration.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH 
ON CONTRACTS xixv, xix (3d ed. 2004).  Similarly, contract defenses are variously categorized in 
first year contracts casebooks.  Fuller and Eisenberg, for example, categorize duress and 
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This Article proposes that basic assumption defenses can best be 
explained and analyzed through the prism of contractual intent.  
Although typically discussed in terms of a singular concept, contractual 
intent in fact comprises various facets, which I refer to as volitional 
intent, cognitive intent, and contextual purposive intent.  Part II provides 
an introduction to, and description of, my proposed expanded intent 
analysis.  Part III applies expanded intent analysis to cases involving 
basic assumption defenses.  Part IV addresses possible concerns with 
using a dynamic approach/expanded intent analysis.  This Article 
concludes that adopting my proposed intent-based analysis has several 
advantages over the current application of contract defenses.  First and 
foremost, it directly addresses and incorporates contract laws two 
primary objectives: furthering autonomy and facilitating transactions.  
Second, because it removes artificial doctrinal distinctions, it eliminates 
or minimizes confusion and simplifies analysis.  Consequently, it 
provides for greater consistency in judicial decisions.  Finally, the 
approach is flexible, and therefore better accommodates technological 
advancements, such as the Internet, in the modern marketplace. 
II. THE THREE FACETS OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT 
Various rationales justify each basic assumption defense, yet there is 
no one consistent organizing principle or framework by which to analyze 
all of them.8  Because each defense incorporates both contract-based and 
                                                                                                                       
unconscionability in the chapter titled The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, while mistakes and 
impracticability are discussed in a chapter titled Mistakes and Changed Circumstances.  FULLER & 
EISENBERG, supra note 1, at vvi.  MacNeil and Gudel include misrepresentation, duress, undue 
influence, capacity, and unconscionability in a chapter titled Social Control and Utilization of 
Contractual Relations, but mistakes are included in the chapter Consequences of Incomplete and 
Ineffective Risk Planning.  IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS EXCHANGE 
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS xxi, xxix (3d ed. 2003) (organizing basic assumption defenses, as 
this Article does, by separating those based on unanticipated events that occur before contract 
formation from those that occur after contract formation). 
Not surprisingly, teaching and learning contract defenses is often challenging.  One law 
professor describes teaching contract defenses as one of the more difficult parts of the basic 
contracts course and describes them as tricky for students to learn.  Miriam Cherry, A 
Tyrannosaurus-Rex Aptly Named Sue: Using a Disputed Dinosaur to Teach Contract Defenses, 
81 N.D. L. REV. 295, 29799 (2005). 
 8. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84 (1977) (noting an inability to 
develop a coherent positive theory consistent with the typical outcomes in recurring cases dealing 
with impossibility, frustration of purpose and impracticability).  See also Kull, supra note 6, at 23 
(noting that mistake and frustration are logically and functionally indistinguishable and 
describing them as two names for the same problem).  Andrew Kull promotes the windfall 
principle as a unified conceptual model to explain mistake and frustration cases.  Under this theory, 
[d]isparities between anticipation and realization . . . the risk of which [have] not been allocated by 
 
10 - KIM FINAL II.DOC 6/13/2008  5:59:08 PM 
476 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
policy-oriented justifications unique to that defense, each defense 
typically must be examined on its own terms rather than as part of a 
larger theory or principle that unifies all defenses.  A dynamic approach 
to contract defenses would essentially eliminate the need for the existing 
doctrinal categories and, along with it, much of the concomitant 
confusion surrounding their application.  I propose a dynamic approach 
that first examines the intent of the contracting parties, and then weighs 
the parties intent against societys interests in the security of 
transactions.9  Discussions of free will have tended to overshadow intent 
as a subject of scholarly inquiry.10  If contracts are enforceable because 
they are the expressions of the free will of the parties, then contracts that 
are not freely entered into should not be enforced.  While this rationale 
may explain the defense of duress, it does not precisely or adequately 
capture basic assumption defenses.  For example, one entering into a 
contract based upon a mistake is not being deprived of free will.  The 
notion of free will or volition is but one aspect of intent.  Intent is often 
equated with contractual purpose and conscious deliberation.  Yet, in 
many cases a failure to consider an occurrence (i.e., a lack of conscious 
deliberation) undermines contractual purpose. 
Intent is not a monolithic or neutral concept.  Determinations of 
intent hinge upon a partys credibility.11  Whether a party is found to be 
credible often depends upon whether the fact-finder understands or 
relates to that party.  In some cases, however, the party and the fact-
                                                                                                                       
the parties, are . . . windfalls . . . .  Id. at 6. 
 9. As Mel Eisenberg notes: 
A modern free enterprise system depends heavily on exchanges over time and on private 
planning.  The extent to which actors will be ready to engage in such exchanges, and are 
able to make reliable plans, depends partly on the probability that promises to render a 
bargained-for performance will be kept. 
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 744. 
 10. As one commentator noted: 
[T]here continues to be a significant amount of debate among contract law scholars over 
the criteria necessary to determine whether a choice was freely made.  While legal 
scholars are in agreement that man possesses free will and that free will is necessary to 
form an enforceable contract, they do not agree on criteria to determine whether the will 
is free in a particular situation. 
Philip Bridwell, Comment, The Philosophical Dimension of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (2003). 
 11. According to Randy E. Barnett: 
[W]e never have direct access to another individuals subjective mental state.  We thus 
must always learn the meaning of terms by comparing (1) the conduct of persons with 
their words, or (2) their conduct and words in one context with those in another, or (3) 
one persons conduct and words with another persons conduct and words.  Even in a 
subjective theory, evidence of subjective assent must be manifested at some pointif 
only from the witness stand or in self-serving documents. 
Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 305 (1986). 
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finder may not share the same set of social or cultural assumptions or 
understandings, and the same act may have different meanings 
depending upon the actor.  Thus, the likelihood of misunderstandings 
arises where cultural dissonance12 exists between the fact-finder and a 
party to a contract dispute.  Ilhyung Lee, for example, has examined the 
differing role of the apology in Korean, Japanese, and American 
societies, and emphasized the importance of recognizing such differences 
in dispute resolution.13  A recent article in the Harvard Business Review 
explained how communication in Western cultures is direct and explicit, 
whereas in many other cultures, meaning is embedded in the way the 
message is presented.14  The authors of that article noted that the 
differences between indirect and direct communication can profoundly 
affect cross-cultural business relationships.15  In addition to direct versus 
indirect communication, they discussed three other categories of cross-
cultural tension within multicultural teams: trouble with accents and 
fluency, differing attitudes toward hierarchy and authority, and 
conflicting norms for decision-making.16  They also observed significant 
cultural differences in decision-making, particularly in how quickly 
decisions should be made.17 
The purpose of contract law is often said to be the realization of 
reasonable expectations induced by promises.18  Reasonable 
expectations, however, do not provide the guiding philosophy or 
theoretical underpinning for contract law.  It explains what contract law 
tries to accomplish, but not why.  Two primary philosophical 
justifications explain why contract law exists.  The first is that private 
                                                     
 12. Elsewhere, I have defined cultural dissonance as differing socio-cultural and experiential 
backgrounds.  See Nancy S. Kim, Blameworthiness, Intent and Cultural Dissonance: The Unequal 
Treatment of Cultural Defense Defendants, 17 FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 199, 202 (2006). 
 13. Ilhyung Lee, The Law and Culture of the Apology in Korean Dispute Settlement, 27 MICH. 
J. INTL L. 1, 17 (2005). 
 14. See Jeanne Brett, Kristin Behfar & Mary C. Kern, Managing Multicultural Teams, HARV. 
BUS. REV., Nov. 2006 at 84. 
 15. In one situation, an American project manager working with Japanese team members 
explained: 
In Japan, they want to talk and discuss.  Then we take a break and they talk within the 
organization.  They want to make sure that theres harmony in the rest of the 
organization.  One of the hardest lessons for me was when I thought they were saying yes 
but they just meant Im listening to you. 
Id. at 86. 
 16. Id.  Brett, Behfar and Kern conclude that cultural challenges to management are 
manageable provided that management avoids imposing single-culture-based approaches on 
multicultural situations.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 88. 
 18. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1 (1952). 
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agreements should be enforced because contracting promotes individual 
autonomy.19  The second predominant justification for contract law is 
that it encourages market transactions and is beneficial to a credit 
economy.20  Neither justification alone suffices.  If the objective of 
contract law is simply to promote individual autonomy, then no contract 
should be enforced unless there was a subjective intent on the part of 
each of the parties to enter into that contract.  If, however, the sole 
objective of contract law is to encourage promissory exchanges, then the 
courts should only permit a party to avoid its contractual obligations 
where there was little or no economic or social utility to that contract.  
Contract defenses navigate the waters between these two philosophies, 
and thus capture the dynamic nature of neoclassical contract law.21 
Dynamic or neoclassical contract law22 considers not only the 
individualistic objectives of contract, but policy issues as well.23  
Dynamic contract law24 adopts as its initial point of inquiry the 
                                                     
 19. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION (1981); Barnett, supra note 11. 
 20. See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d 
ed. 1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 
57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683 (1986); Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, 
in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW, NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed., 2001); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990). 
 21. Not surprisingly, much of what shall be discussed with respect to basic assumption 
defenses in this Article is applicable to other contract defenses, such as fraud and duress. 
 22. Neoclassical contract law is associated with Corbin and the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, and Llewellyn and the Uniform Commercial Code.  John E. Murray, Jr., Contract 
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 870 (2002). 
 23. The concept of dynamic modern contract law was first discussed by Melvin Eisenberg in an 
essay.  See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1743 (2000).  For further general discussion, see Nancy Kim, Evolving Business and Social 
Norms and Interpretation Rules: The Need for a Dynamic Approach to Contract Disputes, 84 NEB. 
L. REV. 506 (2005).  Karl N. Llewellyn is the scholar most closely associated with a dynamic 
approach to contracts.  Murray, supra note 22, at 891 (Llewellyn insisted that the text of the 
bargain should no longer be the sole basis for discerning obligations.  Rather, dynamic, legally 
unformulated, fact patterns of common life provide an immanent law from which the parties 
obligations are derived. (citing Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in 
Commercial Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 782 (1999)).  See also Jay M. Feinman, The Significance 
of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 12881289 (1990). 
 24. Neoclassical contract law, however, is not interchangeable with modern contract law, as 
evidenced by the rise in neoformalism.  See generally Murray, supra note 22.  Murray identifies 
neoformalism as the reaction to the dynamic character of neoclassical law.  Id. at 891.  
Neoformalists are those who 
would create a world of plain meaning interpretation, ridding the adjudication of 
contract disputes of any evidence unexpressed in words, reinstating a draconian parol 
evidence rule, and even precluding the parties themselves from modifying their contract 
or waiving one or more terms in any fashion other than express terms. 
Id. at 912.  In other words, neoformalism is the antithesis of dynamic contract law. 
I distinguish dynamic contract law from neoclassical contract law to emphasize that while 
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subjective intent of the parties.25  The existence (or non-existence) of a 
partys subjective intent, however, must then be balanced by public 
policy concerns, which reflect societal interests.26  In the case of basic 
assumption defenses, the primary policy concern is societys interest in 
the security of economic transactions. 
While promulgating the intent of the parties is generally agreed to 
be one of the primary objectives of contract law, the larger issues of 
determining what that intent is and how to effectuate it have not been 
resolved.  Traditionally, the discussion concerning contractual intent has 
revolved around the Williston versus Corbin debate regarding whether 
contract interpretation should be objective, or objective with subjective 
elements.  This debate, however, misses the point because it reflects, 
rather than resolves, the fundamental tension in contract law between the 
interests of the individual and the interests of society. 
In this section, I set forth a three-part expanded analysis of intent.  
Generally, when a party to a contract seeks to avoid enforcement, she in 
essence is claiming that she did not intend to enter into the agreement at 
all (but was forced), or did not intend to enter into this agreement (but 
was misled, circumstances changed, etc.).27  Consequently, such a 
contract should be enforced only if there is a strong countervailing 
societal interest supporting enforcement. 
                                                                                                                       
neoclassical contract law tends to adopt a more dynamic approach, it is not yet entirely dynamic in 
nature and retains remnants of its classical contract past (such as the requirement of consideration). 
 25. While dynamic contract law examines subjective intent, it is rarely actual intent simply 
because in many cases actual intent is non-existent.  If the parties had actually considered the issue 
giving rise to the request for avoidance, they would have addressed it.  Many scholars object to a 
purely subjective standard.  For example, Randy Barnett observes: 
objectively manifested consent, which usually reflects subjective intent, provides a far 
sounder basis for contractual obligation than do subjectively held intentions.  Evidence of 
subjective intent that is extrinsic to the transaction and was unavailable to the other party 
is relevant, if at all, only insofar as it helps a court to ascertain the objective meaning of 
certain terms. 
Barnett, supra note 11, at 304.  Yet, the problem with objectively manifested consent is that it 
assumes the parties share the same socio-cultural reference points, an assumption that many 
anthropologists and linguists dispute.  See generally ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (Annette 
Lavers, 1972); FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Charles Balley & 
Albert Sechehaye eds., 1972). 
 26. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1745. 
 27. Andrew Kull notes: 
Though a promise is expressed in unqualified terms, a person does not normally mean to 
bind himself to do the impossible, or to persevere when performance proves to be 
materially different from what both parties anticipated at the time of formation.  Faced 
with the adverse consequences of such a disparity, even a person who has previously 
regarded his promise as unconditional is likely to protest that he never promised to do 
that. 
Kull, supra note 6, at 3839. 
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A. Volitional Intent 
Contractual assent requires what I refer to as volitional intent.  
Volitional in this regard is more than an absence of physical coercion; it 
means willingness to enter into the contract.28  This type of willingness 
assumes both a mental and emotional voluntariness as well as an 
unimpaired state of mind on the part of the parties.  A failure of 
volitional intent is thus found in cases that currently raise the defenses of 
intoxication, insanity, duress,29 and procedural unconscionability.30  
Could the party seeking avoidance control her actions?  Was the 
avoiding party coerced into signing the agreement?  Volitional intent 
assumes the autonomous nature of the avoiding partys conduct.  In other 
words, was the act of contracting desired?  Consequently, the non-
avoiding partys conduct is relevant, but only to the extent that it affects 
the avoiding partys autonomy.  Basic assumption defenses do not 
usually involve an absence of volitional intent.31  Accordingly, the 
remainder of this Article will focus primarily on the cognitive and 
contextual purposive aspects of intent. 
B. Cognitive Intent 
A fundamental component of intent is that the contracting parties 
understood what they were doing.  In other words, not only should the 
parties act voluntarily when they enter into an agreement, but they should 
know what it is that they are voluntarily agreeing to do.  An inquiry into 
                                                     
 28. In so doing, I adopt the typical dictionary definition of volition.  Websters, for example, 
defines volition as follows: 1.  An act of willing, choosing, or deciding.  2.  A conscious choice : 
DECISION.  3.  Power or capability of choosing : WILL. WEBSTERS II NEW COLLEGE 
DICTIONARY 1238 (1995).  A larger issue is the distinction that should be made between a volitional 
intent to enter into the transaction and the volitional intent to enter into the written contract.  This is 
a distinction that arises most often with form agreements, including click-wrap and shrink-wrap 
agreements.  See generally Nancy Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797 (2007). 
 29. These defenses may also acknowledge an absence of one or more of the other types of 
intent as well. 
 30. A lack of volitional intent would be found with respect to procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, unconscionability.  Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the CodeThe Emperors 
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 48990 (1967).  In many cases, however, the distinction 
between procedural and substantive unconscionability become blurred, particularly since 
substantively unfair terms are often the result of bargaining naughtiness. 
 31. There may, however, be cases that involve basic assumption defenses as well as defenses 
where there is an absence of volitional intent.  More specifically, the same fact pattern may involve 
both a basic assumption defense such as mistake, and a defense evidencing an absence of volitional 
intent, such as duress.  In that case, however, the duress claim would indicate the lack of volitional 
intent, not the mistake claim. 
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cognitive intent32 asks what information the avoiding party had when he 
or she entered into the contract.  Was the avoiding party operating under 
a belief about a material fact that was wrong (i.e., a mistaken basic 
assumption)?  Was the avoiding party tricked or misled by the other 
party?  Had the avoiding party considered the possibility of the 
occurrence of the excusing event (i.e., was there conscious ignorance or a 
conscious allocation of risk)?  In every contracting situation, each party 
has limited knowledge and is usually aware of its limited knowledge.33  
The cognitive facet of intent, however, does not refer to what a party 
actually knows (or does not know).  Cognitive intent takes into account 
what the parties considered at the time the contract was made.  It 
captures any conscious and express risk allocation between the parties, 
although it does not consider default risk allocation.34  It does not require 
that the parties expressly address the excusing condition in the written 
agreement.  On the other hand, it does not require that the excusing 
condition be unforeseeable.  Judicial recognition of cognitive intent is 
most evident in cases that raise the contract defenses of fraud, mistake 
and unconscionability. Cognitive intent also captures the rationale 
underlying some cases involving the defenses of intoxication and 
immaturity. 
C. Contextual Purposive Intent 
In order to determine whether a party in fact intended to enter into a 
contract, it is necessary to examine both why the party entered into the 
contract, and the relevant circumstances.35  In other words, contextual 
purposive intent examines a partys motive in entering into the contract.36  
The relevant circumstances include both those existing at the time the 
contract was made as well as those arising after contract formation.37  
                                                     
 32. DiMatteo describes a second-order intent that would imbu[e] the reasonable person with 
the knowledge of what the parties knew and what they should have known.  Larry A. DiMatteo, 
The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 
48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 318 (1997).  Cognitive intent reflects aspects of DiMatteos second-order 
intent, but differs from it in that it focuses on the subjective intent of the party. 
 33. Kull, supra note 6, at 2. 
 34. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 35. Contextual purposive intent is captured in Karl Llewellyns vision of a contextual 
agreement.  See John E. Murray, Jr., The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 18 (1981) (discussing Llewellyns views). 
 36. For a discussion of when a mistake in motive should provide relief, see James Gordley, 
Mistake in Contract Formation, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 433 (2004).  Gordley believes that in most 
cases, errors in motive should not warrant relief, but that in certain cases, they do, and should.  Id. at 
435, 46168. 
 37. The importance of examining contractual relations at moments other than at the time of 
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Contextual purposive intent acknowledges concepts of fairness and 
substantive justice that are hidden in many of the defense doctrines.  It 
requiresin fact, assumesthat the avoiding party acted honestly with 
respect to her conduct and intention in entering into the agreement.38  For 
example, a promisor who lied to a promisee could not escape contractual 
liability by claiming that his contextual purposive intent, or motive, in 
entering into the contract was not to perform, but was instead to mislead 
the promisee into undertaking some action.39  The promisee, on the other 
hand, would be able to avoid contract enforcement.  This requirement of 
good faith corresponds to the ordinary dictionary definition of the term.40  
To the extent, however, that good faith implies a norm, such as 
commercial reasonableness,41 that standard does not apply with respect 
to the determination of intent.42 
                                                                                                                       
contract formation has been noted by other scholars.  For example, Barnhizer has noted: 
[T]he relative bargaining power of the parties can shift throughout their interaction.  But 
courts have no consistent approach to the point at which they will assess inequality of 
bargaining power.  Some courts, for example, analyze relative bargaining power at the 
time of the initial offer.  Others look to the bargaining power existing at the time of 
contracting or even at the eventual outcome of the parties bargain.  Given the dynamic 
nature of the power relationship on the level of individual contracts, the choice of timing 
for analysis will significantly affect that analysis. 
Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 23233 (2005). 
 38. For a discussion of the role of intent in promissory fraud cases, see generally IAN AYRES & 
GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT (2005).  The 
authors of that book analyze the intent of the promisor in situations where the innocent promisee 
seeks either to enforce the misrepresentation or sue for reliance based upon the false promise.  Id. at 
1617.  My analysis, on the other hand, considers the intent of the promisor in cases where the 
promisor wishes to avoid contract enforcement.  A promisor who never intended to fulfill her 
promise would not be allowed to escape her contractual obligations on the basis of lack of intent due 
to the lack of good faith. 
 39. This would be an example of promissory fraud.  See generally AYRES & KLASS, supra note 
38. 
 40. The Oxford Dictionary defines good faith as honesty or sincerity of intention.  OXFORD 
DICTIONARY 585 (9th ed. 1995).  Although good faith means honesty, mere negligence does not 
amount to bad faith.  In other words, a party who acts honestly but negligently may still be acting in 
good faith.  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 157 cmt. a (1981) (The mere fact 
that a mistaken party could have avoided the mistake by the exercise of reasonable care does not 
preclude . . . avoidance [on the basis of mistake]).  Ayres and Klass discuss the role of motive, but 
primarily with respect to determining whether the promisor intended to defraud or mislead the 
promisee.  AYRES & KLASS, supra note 38, at 13540. 
 41. The U.C.C., for example, has interpreted good faith to mean honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable . . . standards of fair dealing in the trade.  U.C.C. § 2-103 (1998).  The 
Restatement provides that [e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 
(1981).  For a critical evaluation of the way courts currently employ the doctrine of good faith, see 
Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 2005 
UTAH L. REV. 1 (2005). 
 42. That standard is, however, relevant to the second part of a dynamic analysis, which 
concerns whether avoiding the contract will undermine the security of transactions.  Trade norms 
may be relevant, however, in determining the veracity of a party's claimed cognition or contextual 
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Contextual purposive intent is currently reflected primarily in 
successful cases raising the defense of unconscionability,43 undue 
influence, frustration of purpose, and commercial impracticability.  
Again, the rationale underlying any of these contract defenses may 
include a lack of the other facets of intent discussed above.  Most 
changed circumstances contract defenses, for example, indicate a lack of 
both cognitive intent (because of the failure to consider and accurately 
predict the future) and contextual purposive intent.  Facts indicating a 
lack of contextual purposive intent do not necessarily also indicate a lack 
of cognitive intent.  For example, a grieving widower who signs his 
property over to his deceased beloved wifes family may not lack 
cognitive intent, but may lack contextual purposive intent.  His purpose 
in entering into the agreement is not to convey his property, but to 
demonstrate his gratitude and affection to his wifes memory.44  Thus, in 
some cases, contextual purposive intent may capture the function that 
consideration had under classical contract law. 
Both cognitive and contextual purposive intent involve certain tacit 
assumptions45 about the proposed agreement.  A partys rationale for 
entering into an agreement may be undermined where a partys tacit 
assumptions prove to be invalid.  In such a case, it may no longer be 
accurate to say that the party intended to enter into the agreement given 
the circumstances as they actually were or turned out to be.  Thus, 
consideration of cognitive, and especially contextual purposive, intent 
requires disregarding the parol evidence and plain meaning rules.  
Although this sounds radical in concept, as Part III illustrates, many 
courts already construe both rules so as to minimize or undermine their 
impact.46 
                                                                                                                       
purposive intent. 
 43. Contextual purposive intent will tend to demonstrate substantive unconscionability.  See 
Leff, supra note 30, at 509 (discussing the drafting history of substantive unconscionablility). 
 44. I thank H.G. Prince for sharing this example with me.   
 45. FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 743.  Fuller and Eisenberg note that [w]ords like 
intention . . . imply a conscious state involving an awareness of alternatives and a deliberate choice 
among them.  It is, however, plain that there is a psychological state that can be described as a tacit 
assumption, which does not involve a consciousness of alternatives.  Id. at 744 (emphasis omitted). 
 46. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 172930 (1997) (discussing how many courts cite the plain meaning rule 
yet fail to adhere to it); Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol 
Evidence, and Use of the Just Result Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 570 (1998) (noting that 
California courts tend to engage in a contextual analysis despite citing the plain meaning rule).  See 
Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual 
Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (discussing how courts may adopt a hard or 
soft version of the parol evidence rule). 
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If the furtherance of individual autonomy were the only rationale 
underlying contract enforcement, one might argue that only subjective 
intent should be relevant, and that a party should always be able to 
escape contractual liability in the event that the party misunderstood the 
terms of an agreement or simply changed her mind.  Yet, a completely 
subjective standard would decrease the reliability of agreements, and 
would consequently impede the flow of transactions.  Thus, 
consideration of the partys subjective intent must be tempered by the 
other objective of contract lawto encourage promissory transactions by 
ensuring the security of transactions.  Classical contract law strove to 
reconcile these two competing objectives by analyzing the disputed 
exchange from the standpoint of a reasonable man.47  Although created 
in order to accommodate the twin goals of contract law, 
reasonableness supplants them.48  It collapses the two primary 
objectives of contract law into one standard.  Modern contract law also 
adopts the objective theory, albeit with subjective elements.  A tension 
arises in contract law between the objective theorys goal of norm 
creation and reinforcement, and the subjective theorys deference to 
individuals desires.  This tension manifests itself in the laws approach 
to contract defenses.  I propose an alternative approach that balances the 
three facets of intent against societys interest in the security of 
transactions, which, in turn, promotes market exchanges in a credit 
economy.  The following diagram illustrates this approach: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 47. Feinman, supra note 23, at 128589. 
 48. As my colleague Tom Barton pointed out, the objective standard may actually undermine 
both of contract laws objectives by ignoring individual autonomy in a given case, and because a 
reasonable person may, due to bounded rationality, engage in economically inefficient 
transactions. 
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Dynamic Approach to Contracts 
 
 
Volitional intent analysis asks whether the party wanted to enter into 
the transaction.  Cognitive intent analysis asks whether the party 
understood what she or he was doing.  Contextual purposive intent 
analysis considers the partys reason or motive for entering into the 
transaction.  In the following section, I examine each of the basic 
assumption defenses in the context of a given case, and then analyze the 
case through the prism of the aforementioned expanded intent analysis. 
III. APPLYING THE INTENT ANALYSIS TO BASIC ASSUMPTION DEFENSES 
Basic assumption defenses can be divided into two categoriesthose 
based upon facts existing at the time of contract formation, and those 
based upon facts arising after contract formation.  The distinction 
between the two is a legacy of classical contract laws fixation on 
formation, and unnecessarily complicates analysis of problems arising 
from basic assumption errors.  As this Section explains, the critical issue 
is not the timing of events, but the parties contractual intent. 
Contractual 
intent 
Policy
Protect 
security of 
transactions 
& promote 
market 
exchanges 
Volitional 
intent 
Cognitive 
intent 
Contextual 
purposive 
intent 
(assumes 
good faith) 
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A. Pre-Formation Basic Assumption Errors 
1. Mutual Mistake 
As many first-year Contracts professors know,49 the doctrine of 
mistake continues to baffle many students who are unable to reconcile 
the different outcomes in similar cases.50  The cases where an adversely 
affected party has been allowed to avoid a contract on the grounds of 
mutual mistake are inconsistent in both reasoning and result.51  In one 
familiar case, Wood v. Boynton, the plaintiff sold what she believed to be 
a rock to the defendant, who was also unaware of its identity. 52  When 
the plaintiff discovered that the rock was in fact an uncut diamond, she 
sought to rescind the sale by offering the original price plus interest.53  
The buyer refused and the seller sued.54  The court found that the seller 
had assumed the risk that the stone would be of greater value than the 
price the buyer paid.55 
Sherwood v. Walker56 stands in stark contrast.  In that case, the 
parties entered into an agreement for the sale of a cow.57  Both parties 
believed that the cow was barren.58  When the cow was discovered to be 
                                                     
 49. See generally Cherry, supra note 7. 
 50. See also FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.3 (The cases in which an adversely affected 
party has been allowed to avoid the contract on [the ground of mutual mistake] are not marked by 
their consistency in either reasoning or result.). 
 51. Id.  See also Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 
(2003).  Eisenberg states: 
The problems raised by mistake have been a source of persistent difficulty in contract 
law.  In part this difficulty results from the complex nature of the underlying issues . . . .  
Much of the difficulty, however, results from the use of legal categories and doctrinal 
rules that are not sufficiently based on a functional analysis. 
Id. at 1575. 
Eisenberg proposes a functional analysis of issues raised by mistake which involves 
characterizing the type of mistake, and then developing the rules that should govern each type of 
mistake in light of applicable social propositions.  Id. at 157678. 
 52. 25 N.W. 42, 44 (Wis. 1885).  I am somewhat skeptical that the buyer, who was a jeweler, 
did not know that the rock was actually a diamond, but am of course constrained by the courts 
factual findings in the case. 
 53. Id. at 43. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 45 ([I]n the absence of fraud or warranty, the value of the property sold, as 
compared with the price paid, is no ground for rescission of sale.). 
 56. 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
 57. Id. at 919. 
 58. Id. at 920.  The dissent points out, however, that the buyer might not have been entirely 
convinced of the infertility of the cow Rose of Abermarle: 
The record . . . shows that the defendants, when they sold the cow, believed the cow was 
not with calf, and barren; that from what the plaintiff had been told by defendants (for it 
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with calf, the defendants sought to rescind the agreement by withholding 
delivery.59  The court found in favor of the defendants, stating that the 
mistake of the parties was not of the mere quality of the animal, but 
went to the very nature of the thing.  A barren cow is a substantially 
different creature than a breeding one.60 
Under expanded intent analysis, the parties in both cases, while 
possessing volitional intent, lacked the cognitive intent to enter into the 
contract.  In Sherwood v. Walker, the parties believed they were 
contracting for an infertile cow, but their information was inaccurate.61  
The parties never intended to enter into a contract for the sale and 
purchase of a fertile cowat least not for the price that was paid.62  In 
Wood v. Boynton, the parties similarly did not intend to enter into a 
contract for the purchase and sale of an uncut diamond.63  In addition, the 
sellers in both cases lacked the contextual purposive intent to enter into 
the contract given the facts as they actually were.  The seller in Wood v. 
Boynton intended to sell a rock, not a diamond.64  The seller in Sherwood 
v. Walker intended to sell a barren cow, not a fertile one.65  The seller in 
each case might have sold the item in question at a higher price if its true 
nature were known, but they might just as well not have wanted to sell 
the item at all.  For example, the seller in Sherwood v. Walker might 
have decided to keep the cow to produce calves.  The seller in Wood v. 
Boynton might have preferred to keep the diamond for herself.  The 
buyers, on the other hand, lacked cognitive intent, but not contextual 
purposive intent.  They did not know what they were buying, and so they 
could not have had the cognitive intent to engage in the transaction.  
Their contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was to 
                                                                                                                       
does not appear he had any knowledge or facts from which he could form an opinion) he 
believed the cow was farrow, but still thought she could be made to breed . . . .  There is 
no question but that the defendants sold the cow representing her of the breed and quality 
they believed the cow to be, and that the purchaser so understood it.  And the buyer 
purchased her believing her to be of the breed represented by the sellers, and possessing 
all the qualities stated, and even more.  He believed she would breed.  There is no 
pretense that the plaintiff bought the cow for beef, and there is nothing in the record 
indicating that he would have bought her at all only that he thought she might be made to 
breed. 
Id. at 92425 (Sherwood, J., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 923. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Even if the buyer did intend to buy an uncut diamond, it is clear that the seller did not 
intend to sell one.  The intent analysis looks at whether both parties intended to enter into the 
agreement. 
 64. 25 N.W. 42, 4344 (Wis. 1885). 
 65. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 923. 
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promote their pecuniary interestsomething that was not defeated, but 
rather promoted when the true facts were discovered.  The buyer in 
Sherwood v. Walker, for example, intended to buy a cow for financial 
reasons (to sell its milk or meat), not for emotional ones (to keep as a 
pet).66  The jeweler/buyer in Wood v. Boynton presumably intended to 
buy a rock to sell to his customers (i.e. to make money) and not because 
he was a rock collector.  Neither buyers purpose in entering into the 
contract was injured or undermined by his discovery.67 
Under a dynamic approach, however, the intent inquiry would not 
end the analysis of enforceability.  A court might still choose to enforce 
the contract if societys interest in the security of transactions 
outweighed the lack of intent.  In Sherwood v. Walker, the plaintiffs 
sought to enforce the contract by claiming title had passed, whereas the 
defendants retained possession of the cow and claimed the contract was 
executory.68  By contrast, in Wood v. Boynton, the plaintiff seller sought 
rescission after the money was paid and possession of the diamond 
transferred to the defendant buyer.69  It may be that the societal interest 
in ensuring the stability of transactions is undermined to a greater extent 
where the agreement has been fully performed (e.g., where property has 
already been paid for and delivered).70 
The Second Restatement attempts to capture the doctrine of mistake.  
It defines mistake as a belief that is not in accord with the facts.71  In 
order to avoid a contract based on mistake, the mistake must be one as to 
a basic assumption on which the contract was made,72 and must have a 
material effect on the agreed exchange of performances.73  The 
requirement that the mistake have a material effect reflects both the 
relevance of intent, and the promotion of a policy of fairness.  The intent 
aspect considers whether the parties would have entered into the contract 
if they had known the facts as they actually were.  In addition, the 
material effect requirement promotes fairness, and thus, contractual 
                                                     
 66. Id. 
 67. I provide this discussion to demonstrate the differences between cognitive and contextual 
purposive intent.  The fortunate buyer in a mistake situation is not injured and would not be trying to 
avoid enforcement of the contract; thus, her intent would not be at issue. 
 68. Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 919. 
 69. Wood, 25 N.W. at 44. 
 70. Andrew Kull has noted the judicial disposition to let windfalls lie, meaning that courts 
will not enforce executory agreements based upon a mistake, but neither will they rescind fully 
performed agreements despite the existence of a mutual mistake.  See generally, Kull, supra note 6, 
at 6. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981). 
 72. Id. § 152. 
 73. Id. 
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exchanges.  Prospective parties are more likely to engage in contracts if 
judicial enforcement in mistake situations is perceived as fair. 
A further requirement is that the mistake must relate to facts existing 
at the time the contract was made.74  If these requirements are met, the 
contract is voidable by the adversely affected party provided that he or 
she did not bear[] the risk of the mistake.75  A requirement that the 
avoiding party not bear the risk of the mistake furthers the fairness 
objective. 
The remedies for mutual mistakes are avoidance and restitution.76  In 
fashioning a remedy, however, the courts often reveal their confusion of 
mutual mistakes with transcription errors or mistakes in 
transcription.77  Thus, courts have ordered reformation78 after finding 
the existence of a mutual mistake.  For example, in Shupe v. Nelson, a 
California appellate court stated that [r]eformation may be had for a 
mutual mistake or for the mistake of one party which the other knew or 
suspected, but in either situation the purpose of the remedy is to make the 
written contract truly express the intention of the parties. 79  In Shupe, 
the plaintiffs sued the defendants after access to the roadway from their 
garage and driveway was eliminated by construction of a fence.80  The 
lot owned by plaintiffs was part of a common housing development 
consisting of four lots.81  As part of the development plan, all four of the 
lots were to have access to the roadway.82  The access right to the 
                                                     
 74. Id. § 151 cmt. a. 
 75. Id. § 152.  A party bears the risk of the mistake in the following instances: 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or (b) he is aware, at the time 
the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to 
which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient, or (c) the risk is 
allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable in the circumstances to do 
so. 
Id. § 154. 
 76. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.3. 
 77. See Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 161011 (defining mistranscriptions as a special case of 
mechanical errors where the appropriate relief is to amend the writing to reflect the actual bargain). 
 78. See CORBIN, supra note 18, § 614 (Reformation is not a proper remedy for the 
enforcement of terms to which the defendant never assented . . . .).  See also Kull, supra note 6, at 
37 (stating that reformation is an innovative form of relief when mistake is present).  Interestingly, 
the availability of reformation as a remedy in mutual mistake cases is expressly granted under 
section 3399 of the California Civil Code, even though reformation is not the typical remedy for 
mistake.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3399 (West 1997) (allowing revision of a contract in the case of 
mutual mistake). 
 79. Shupe v. Nelson, 62 Cal. Rptr. 352, 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967). 
 80. Id. at 355, n.1. 
 81. Id. at 35556. 
 82. See id. at 356 (stating that the plan . . . intended to reserve . . . joint use and benefit for all 
four lots). 
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roadway for the plaintiffs lot, however, was omitted from the deeds.  
The trial court found that the omission of the reservation of access rights 
was the result of a mutual mistake, and ordered a reformation of all of 
the deeds to the four lots to include the omitted access rights.83  The 
appellate court agreed, stating that [w]here the failure of the written 
contract to express the intention of the parties is due to the inadvertence 
of both of them, the mistake is mutual and the contract may be revised on 
the application of the party aggrieved.84  Yet, the facts indicate not a 
mutual mistake as to a basic assumption, but a transcription error, 
something which the court acknowledges in stating that the defendant: 
[F]ailed to properly instruct the title company at the time of the 1961 
conveyances that [the plaintiffs] lot was part of the same ownership 
and that the easements and right to use [the roadway] should also be 
included for the benefit of that lot.  Mistake by a scrivener or draftsman 
in reducing the intent of the parties to writing is ground for 
reformation.85 
While the court inaccurately categorized the type of mistake, it 
focused on what was importantthe intent of the parties.  In Shupe, the 
parties intended to enter into an agreement that reserved access rights to 
the plaintiffs property, but the agreement failed to reflect that intent.  
Cognitive and contextual purposive intent existed, but only with respect 
to the deeds as reformed.  Conversely, the deeds as actually written 
should not have been enforced because both facets of intent to enter into 
the contract were lacking.  Although inconsistent in its analysis of 
mistake, the court ordered the correct remedy, implementing what the 
parties intended. 
In another case, Par 3, Inc. v. Livingston,86 the Nebraska Supreme 
Court mischaracterized the remedy in explaining the basis for non-
enforcement.  In Par 3, the defendant Livingston, president of a 
corporation called Castle Development, entered into a contract with the 
plaintiffs pursuant to which the corporation would purchase and plant 
trees for a proposed real estate and golf course development tentatively 
called Castle Brook.87  The contract was signed by representatives of the 
plaintiffs and by Livingston.88  The words TITLE/CASTLEBROOK 
                                                     
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 357. 
 85. Id. at 358. 
 86. 686 N.W.2d 369 (Neb. 2004). 
 87. Id. at 371. 
 88. Id. 
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were typed below Livingstons signature, and above the word TITLE, 
the defendant had written Pres.89  The Castle Brook project failed to 
develop and the plaintiffs filed suit against Livingston for breach of 
contract.90  In his answer, Livingston alleged that he was not personally 
liable on the contract because he was acting in his capacity as president 
of Castle Development.91  The district court agreed, and dismissed the 
plaintiffs petitions.92  The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that Livingston 
signed on behalf of an entityCastle Brookthat was never 
incorporated, making him personally liable under Nebraska law.93  They 
further claimed that the court erred in using extrinsic and parol evidence 
to add to and vary the terms of a clear and unambiguous contract.94  
Livingston argued that he intended to enter into the contract as president 
of Castle Development and that he was unaware at the time he signed the 
contract that the name of the entity on the document was incorrect.95 
The district court concluded that Livingston intended to, and did, 
sign the contract as president of Castle Development, and not in his 
personal capacity.96  On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district 
court erred in reforming the contract.97  The Nebraska Supreme Court 
first noted that reformation may be had when there has been either a 
mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake caused by fraud or inequitable 
conduct on the part of the party against whom reformation is sought.98  
The court then found that the lower courts conclusion that Livingston 
was not personally liable was not based upon any alleged mistake in the 
contract, but was instead premised on the conclusion that none of the 
parties involved in the contract intended to incur personal liability.99  
The Nebraska Supreme Court thus concluded that the district court did 
not reform the contract.100  Yet, the finding that Livingston was not 
personally liable could be sustained only if there was a mistake in 
transcription and, at least, a consequent conceptual reformation of the 
contract to indicate that he signed the document as president of Castle 
                                                     
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 372. 
 94. Id. at 373. 
 95. Id. at 372. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 373. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  In addition, plaintiff corporations president testified that he believed he was dealing 
with a corporation when he entered into the contract.  Id. at 372. 
 100. Id. at 373. 
10 - KIM FINAL II.DOC 6/13/2008  5:59:08 PM 
492 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Development and not Castle Brook.  Furthermore, the court claimed that 
the evidence of Livingstons intent did not add to and vary the terms of 
the contract.101  On the contrary, the agreement stated in plain and 
unambiguous language that Livingston was signing the agreement on 
behalf of Castle Brook.  The court denied the applicability of traditional 
contract law principles in order to address the important and more 
relevant issue of whether the parties intended for Livingston to incur 
personal liability under the agreement.  The Par 3 courts conclusion is 
supported using my proposed intent analysis.  Livingston lacked the 
cognitive intent to enter into the transaction because he did not 
understand that the contract was between himself personally (and not the 
corporation) and the plaintiffs.  His contextual purposive intent in 
entering into the contract was to act as an agent for his company in 
conducting businessnot to engage in the business transaction on his 
own behalf.  Because the plaintiffs also believed that Livingston was 
acting on behalf of Castle Development, and not as an individual, the 
security of transactions objective was not undermined by dismissing the 
plaintiffs claims. 
The parties to a contract often are at a loss themselves as to which 
basic assumption defense is applicable, given the similarities of the 
defenses, and that the same factual circumstances give rise to different 
defenses.  In one case, Nelson v. Cowles Ford, the plaintiff buyer sued 
the defendant car dealership after purchasing a used Ford Expedition 
with an altered odometer.102  The defendant car dealership raised the 
jumbled defense of impossibility due to mutual mistake.103  The court 
addressed the defendants confusion regarding the defenses as follows: 
Whether Cowles Ford intended to raise the distinct defense of mutual 
mistake is unclear, but in any event unimportant, because neither 
defense is applicable here.  Mutual mistake only allows the injured 
party to void the contract . . . .  Nelson [the plaintiff] is clearly the 
injured party because he paid for a vehicle with a market value much 
higher than he received.  Impossibility under Virginia law exists only 
upon the occurrence of an event, the non-occurrence of which was the 
basic assumption upon which the contract was made . . . .  Cowles Ford 
can identify no intervening occurrence in the case at bar.104 
                                                     
 101. Id. at 374. 
 102. 77 Fed. Appx 637, 639 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 103. Id. at 643. 
 104. Id. 
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In some cases, the court itself will assist a party who relies upon an 
inapplicable defense.  In Gutierrez v. Schultz, the plaintiff Gutierrez filed 
a negligence complaint for injuries after being struck by a truck driven 
by the defendant.105  The defendant Schultz filed a motion to dismiss, 
attaching a copy of a draft in the amount of $6000 from Allstate 
Insurance, made payable to and endorsed by Gutierrez.106  The lower 
court granted the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff appealed, claiming, 
among other things, that the court erred in not permitting parol evidence 
on the question of the issues of fraud, misrepresentation, and mutual 
mistake in connection with the draft.107  During hearings on the motion 
to dismiss, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence relating to the 
circumstances surrounding the acceptance and negotiation of the Allstate 
draft.108  The court sustained defense counsels motion to exclude the 
evidence based in part on the parol evidence rule.109  Gutierrez made an 
offer of proof and testified that an Allstate adjuster visited him while he 
was in the hospital.110  The adjuster told him that the company was 
concerned about his injuries and that Allstate would take care of 
everything, including lost wages (approximately $14,000) and medical 
expenses (approximately $2500).111  The plaintiff claimed that the 
adjuster also told him that if he needed money, Allstate would advance 
it to him.112  Gutierrez claimed that two weeks before he received the 
check (which purported to be in exchange for a full and complete 
release), he had another conversation with the adjuster, and indicated that 
he would be amenable to a fair settlement, meaning lost wages, bills, and 
medical expenses.113  There was no agreement on a settlement amount, 
according to Gutierrez.114  Approximately two or three weeks after this 
conversation, Gutierrez received a check for $6000 that contained on its 
face, in normal size print, the following language: In payment of any 
and all claims including bodily injury arising from accident of 12-12-78 
in Sterling, Illinois.115  Gutierrez testified that he understood the check 
                                                     
 105. 440 N.E.2d 451, 45253 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). 
 106. Id. at 452. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 45253. 
 112. Id. at 453. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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to be partial payment only.116  He further testified that two or three weeks 
after he received the draft check, he received a release form from 
Allstate, which he threw away.117  After the offer of proof concluded, the 
lower court opined that the check was a release of all claims, and that 
the plaintiffs endorsement of it estopped him from pursuing the 
negligence action.118  The lower court further stated its opinion that 
Allstate was not liable for fraud or misrepresentation, and concluded that 
there was no mutual mistake of fact.119 
The Appellate Court for the Third District of Illinois reversed and 
remanded.  Skirting the issues of fraud and mutual mistake, the court 
stated: 
The threshold issue in the instant case is not whether the release should 
be set aside based upon fraud or mutual mistake, but whether there was 
a release at all.  The plaintiff argues that the court erred in not 
considering his evidence concerning the circumstances leading up to 
and surrounding his endorsement of the check.  Plaintiffs position is 
that his evidence indicated that it was not his intention, by endorsing 
and cashing the check, to release and fully settle his claim . . . .  The 
insurer argues that the check on its face clearly and unambiguously 
evidences an intent to release and settle all claims arising from the 
accident.  In so arguing, it concludes that the document is 
unequivocally a release and settlement of all claims and that any 
evidence to the contrary is impermissible.  We disagree, and conclude 
that plaintiffs evidence ought to have been considered, since it was 
relevant to the issue of the intentions of the parties with respect to the 
check.120 
The court focused on contractual intent, but not as traditionally defined.  
While the plaintiff clearly had the volitional intent to accept the check 
(and thus, the settlement), contextual purposive intent and cognitive 
intent were lacking.  The defendant sought to keep out the events that 
occurred prior to the cashing of the check under the parol evidence rule; 
however, those circumstances are relevant in examining the existence (or 
non-existence) of both cognitive and contextual purposive intent.  The 
court noted that the evidence of surrounding circumstances, which 
ought to have been considered on the issue of intentions, indicates that 
the insurance agent had represented that the company would take care of 
                                                     
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 454. 
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everything, including lost wages.121  In other words, the cashing of the 
draft in a vacuum does not provide an accurate picture of what the 
plaintiff intended when he so acted.  The extrinsic evidence was needed 
to determine why the plaintiff cashed the check.  Was it to settle the 
claim with Allstate, or to accept part payment of a forthcoming 
settlement? 
In addition, the court indicated that cognitive intent was lacking 
when it stated the following: 
In the instant case, the language on the check did not use the words 
release, discharge, settle or even payment in full.  Furthermore, the 
language of release . . . herein was in regular size print in the middle of 
the front of the check.  We are not dealing in this case with a document 
entitled release and settlement, but rather with a document whose 
primary stated purpose and whose outward formal characteristics 
indicate that it is merely a check.  Even assuming that the language 
used would be understood by the layman as a release and settlement, it 
would be inappropriate to assess that language divorced from the 
document as a whole, both its substantive and formal aspects.  This 
document, except for the sentence with respect to what the payment 
was being made for, was in all other respects a check.  We find it 
conceivable and reasonable, in light of the form of the document and 
the language used . . . that plaintiff herein felt that the check he 
received was merely payment towards his claim, and not full payment 
evidencing a final settlement and release of his claim.122 
Thus, the courts objective is to determine the parties multi-faceted 
intent.  The $6000 draft was filled out by a typewriter, with Gutierrezs 
name as claimant listed just below the name of Schultz as the insured.123  
Just under Gutierrezs name, in the same size type, next to the words, In 
payment of were the words, Any and all claims including bodily injury 
arising from accident of 12-12-78 in Sterling, Ill.124  As the dissent 
states, I cannot believe that any reasonable person would interpret that 
statement to mean anything other than what it says; that the payment was 
intended to bar all personal injury claims of plaintiff arising out of the 
accident.125  Yet, what the appellate court considered was not the intent 
of the reasonable person, but Gutierrezs actual, subjective intent,  
 
                                                     
 121. Id. at 455. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 456. 
 124. Id. (Barry, J., dissenting). 
 125. Id. 
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taking into account the cognitive and contextual purposive facets of 
intent.126 
2. Unilateral Mistake 
In mutual mistake cases, both parties are operating under the same 
misperception as to material facts.127  In unilateral mistake cases, only 
one party has an erroneous perception as to the facts.128  In order to avoid 
a contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake, the adversely affected 
party must show the requirements necessary for mutual mistake.  In 
addition, the adversely affected party must also show either that the 
effect of the mistake would make enforcement of the contract 
unconscionable or that the other party had reason to know of the mistake, 
or caused the mistake.129  If the doctrinal distinction between unilateral 
and mutual mistake is weak, the factual distinction is sometimes 
imperceptible.130  Not surprisingly, avoiding parties often seem confused 
about whether they should claim mutual or unilateral mistake, as the 
same facts often give rise to claims for both defenses.131 
Courts generally have been reluctant to allow avoidance in cases 
where parties have sought relief on the grounds of unilateral mistake.132  
Typically, successful cases have involved technical or computational 
errors.133  For example, in M.F. Kemper Construction Co. v. City of Los 
                                                     
 126. See id. at 455 (majority opinion). 
 127. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, at § 9.3.  A mutual mistake should be distinguished from a 
misunderstanding, where two parties attach different meanings to their language.  Id. at § 9.2. 
 128. Id. at § 9.4. 
 129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981). 
 130. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 597 (1960).  See also Eric 
Rasmusen & Ian Ayres, Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 
312 (1993). 
 131. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Idacorp, Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff 
utility company based complaint on theories of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, duress and 
unconscionability); Am. Annuity Group, Inc. v. Guaranty Reassurance Corp. Liquidating Trust, 55 
Fed. Appx 255, 256 (6th Cir. 2003) (defendant trust filed an amended counterclaim seeking 
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, and fraud); Indep. Order of Foresters 
v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 157 F.3d 933, 93637 (2d Cir. 1998) (purchaser sued on the basis 
of both mutual and unilateral mistake); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 962 (3d Cir. 
1991) (appellant corporation claimed settlement agreement was the result of a mutual mistake or 
in the alternative, a unilateral mistake).  See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 25859 (1988) (stating that courts often use the term mutual mistake in decisions not 
to enforce a promise and unilateral mistake in decisions to enforce a promise, thus emptying the 
terms of their original meanings). 
 132. See, e.g., M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 P.2d 7, 912 (Cal. 1951) 
(Generally, relief is refused for error in judgment and allowed only for clerical or mathematical 
mistakes.). 
 133. Id. 
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Angeles, the California Supreme Court allowed a construction company 
to cancel a bid it had submitted on public construction work.134  The 
company had unintentionally omitted a $301,769 item in its bid, and did 
not discover its error until after the bids were opened.135  Pursuant to the 
city charter, the notice inviting bids provided that each bid must be 
submitted by a bond for an amount not less than ten percent of the bid 
amount as a guarantee that the bidder would enter into the contract if it 
were awarded to him.136  The charter further provided that after the bids 
were opened, they could not be withdrawn without the citys consent.137  
All submitted bids would be subject to acceptance by the city for a 
period of three months even though the notice reserved to the city the 
right to reject any and all bids.138  The company immediately notified the 
city of its error and two days later, withdrew its bid.139  A few days later, 
the city passed a resolution accepting the erroneous bid.140  The company 
refused to enter into a contract, and the city awarded the contract to the 
next lowest bidder and demanded forfeiture of the companys bond.141  
The California Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the 
companys unilateral mistake permitted cancellation of the submitted bid 
and allowed the city to recover nothing.142 
Yet, the California Supreme Court came to a different conclusion in 
another case involving a computational error made by a contractor in 
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.143  The defendant subcontractor had 
submitted a $7131.60 bid to plaintiff general contractor for certain 
paving work.144  The plaintiff incorporated that bid in his own bid and 
submitted it with the name of [the] defendant as the subcontractor for 
the paving.145  The plaintiff was awarded the contract, and stopped by 
the defendants office the following day.146  At that time, the defendant 
informed the plaintiff that he had made a mistake in the bid for the 
paving work and refused to do the paving work for less than $15,000.147  
                                                     
 134. Id. at 11. 
 135. Id. at 9. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 910. 
 142. Id. at 1213. 
 143. 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958). 
 144. Id. at 758. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 75859. 
 147. Id. 
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The plaintiff finally engaged another firm to do the work for about 
$11,000.148  The California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court 
decision in favor of the plaintiff and found that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel could be used to make the offer binding.  The 
California Supreme Court distinguished M.F. Kemper on the grounds 
that in that case there was no reasonable, detrimental reliance because 
the bidders mistake was known or should have been to the offeree, and 
the offeree could be placed in status quo.149 
These two cases can be reconciled using a dynamic approach that 
adopts an expanded intent analysis.  Both the contractor in M.F. Kemper 
and the subcontractor in Drennan lacked cognitive intent to enter into the 
contract.  Both parties submitted bids based upon computational errors 
and both parties would not have entered into the contract if they had been 
made aware of their mistakes.  Furthermore, both parties likely lacked 
contextual purposive intent.  Their objective was presumably to make a 
profit on the services they would provide, which was likely undermined 
by their mistakes.  Given the lack of both cognitive and contextual 
purposive intent, the societal interest in ensuring the security of 
transactions must be rather significant to compel enforcement.  In M.F. 
Kemper, the non-avoiding party had not accepted the bid, and there was 
no detrimental reliance.150  Given the nature of the bidding process, the 
city was uninjured.  The city had only to go to the next lowest bidder, as 
that bidder was compelled to keep its bid open for three months.151  
Furthermore, there was no justifiable expectation interest as the 
contractor informed the city of his mistake only hours after the bids were 
opened, prior to acceptance, and with plenty of time for the city to find 
another contractor.152  In other words, the non-enforcement of the bid in 
M.F. Kemper was unlikely to deter future transactions. 
On the other hand, the facts of Drennan provide a compelling 
rationale for enforcement.  Unlike in M.F. Kemper, the non-mistaken 
party detrimentally relied on the mistake in committing to perform the 
general contract.153  To make matters worse, the mistaken party did not 
immediately notify the other party of his mistake and waited until the 
plaintiff paid him a visit.154  The failure to enforce the agreement in 
                                                     
 148. Id. at 759. 
 149. Id. at 761. 
 150. M.F. Kemper Constr. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 P.2d 7, 913 (Cal. 1951). 
 151. Id. at 911. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Drennan, 333 P.2d at 75960. 
 154. Id. at 75859. 
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Drennan, given the existence of detrimental reliance and good faith on 
the part of the non-mistaken party (who spent several months trying to 
get other bids and who accepted the lowest of those bids),155 would likely 
deter similarly situated parties from future transactions, or more likely, 
burden the contracting process with onerous liability terms. 
In another contractor case, the California Supreme Court allowed 
rescission of a contract on the grounds of unilateral mistake even though 
the contract was accepted prior to discovery of the mistake.  In Elsinore 
Union Elementary School District v. Kastorff, the defendant, a building 
contractor, was sued by the plaintiff school district for damages after 
refusing to perform a winning construction bid.156  The defendant 
established that the bid resulted from a good faith mistake made under 
the pressure of the frenzied bidding process.157  The bid was accepted on 
August 12, and the defendant discovered the clerical error the next 
morning.158  That same morning, he notified the school district and asked 
to be released from the bid.159  On August 14, the defendant wrote a letter 
to the school district again explaining the error and asking to be 
released.160  On August 15, the school district held a special meeting 
and voted not to grant Kastorffs request.161  On August 28, the school 
district gave written notification of award of the contract and submitted a 
written contract for signature.162  The defendant refused and the school 
district sued.163  Using an expanded intent analysis, the courts decision 
can be explained given that the defendant did not have cognitive or 
contextual purposive intent to enter into an agreement based on the bid as 
submitted.  Furthermore, the call for bids required all bidders to keep 
their bids open for a period of forty-five days after the date set for 
opening.164  While it is unclear whether the plaintiff had the option of 
accepting the next lowest bid, given the frenzied nature of the bidding 
process and the safeguards available to the party seeking bids, rescinding 
the contract caused minimal, if any, danger to the societal interest in the 
security of transactions. 
                                                     
 155. Id. at 761. 
 156. 353 P.2d 713, 71415 (Cal. 1960). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 714. 
 159. Id. at 715. 
 160. Id. 
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 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 715 n.2. 
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In a more recent case, Donovan v. RRL Corp., the California 
Supreme Court held in favor of a defendant automobile dealer who had 
made a typographical error by listing a used Jaguar for sale at a price that 
was approximately $12,000 less than what he intended.165  The plaintiff 
test-drove the Jaguar, and then told defendants salesperson, Okay.  We 
will take it at your price, $26,000.166  Then he was told that the 
advertisement was a mistake.167  The sales manager offered to pay for the 
plaintiffs fuel, time, and effort expended in traveling to the dealership, 
but the plaintiff refused.168  The sales manager then offered to sell the 
plaintiff the vehicle for $37,016, approximately $900 less than the 
intended sales price.169  The plaintiff refused and filed suit.170  The 
California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant and reversed 
the appellate courts judgment on the grounds that the defendant had 
made a unilateral mistake in advertising the sale price of the Jaguar.171  In 
so doing, that court stated that to enforce the contract would be 
unconscionable because the mistake was an error amounting to thirty-
two percent of the intended price.172 
In reality, it is unlikely that a $12,000 mistake borne by a luxury car 
dealership would be unconscionable, especially when that loss 
includes anticipated profit.  In other words, the dealership had paid 
$35,000 for the Jaguar.173  Thus, the actual loss was closer to $9000.  
The courts decision may be given a more credible explanation using an 
expanded intent analysis.  The defendant never intended to sell the 
vehicle at the advertised price.  Thus, there was an absence of volitional, 
cognitive, and contextual purposive intent (assuming that the mistake 
was made in good faith and not a bait-and-switch maneuver).  
Furthermore, the plaintiff was notified of the error immediately after 
acceptance, and the defendant offered to pay for reliance damages.  Thus, 
allowing the defendant to avoid the contract would not have a 
detrimental effect on the societal interest in the security of 
transactions.174 
                                                     
 165. 27 P.3d 702, 708 (Cal. 2001). 
 166. Id. at 707. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 70607. 
 172. Id. at 72324. 
 173. Id. at 722. 
 174. This author might have come to a different conclusion on the basis of the California Motor 
Vehicle Code, section 11713.1, which makes it unlawful for an automobile dealer not to sell a 
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3. Misunderstanding 
Technically, misunderstandings are not defenses to contracts as they 
affect the very formation of a contract.  In other words, if the parties 
lacked mutual assent, a contract was never formed in the first place, thus 
obviating the need for a defense.175  In practice, however, 
misunderstandings are used the same way that other contract defenses are 
usedto avoid enforcement of a contract.  Furthermore, while the 
difference between misunderstanding and contract defenses is 
theoretically straightforward, the distinction that courts make between 
the two is often unclear in application.  For example, in Krossa v. All 
Alaskan Seafoods, Inc.,176 the Supreme Court of Alaska appears to have 
confused misunderstanding with mutual mistake.  In that case, John 
Krossa signed a contract with All Alaskan Seafoods to fish for crab in 
exchange for a percentage of the gross receipts.177 The Alaskan 
Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the superior court, concluded 
that the contract between the parties was invalid because the parties had 
different understandings of the term gross receipts.178  In so 
concluding, that court stated that if the term gross receipts as used in 
the written agreement had no plain meaning and was instead ambiguous, 
we must conclude that no contract existed during that time.179  Although 
Krossa and All Alaskan Seafoods agreed that gross receipts should be 
defined as weight times price, they disagreed as to what the price should 
be.180  Krossa argued that because the contract contained an integration 
clause, the parol evidence rule barred introduction of extrinsic evidence 
in construing its meaning.181  The Alaskan Supreme Court disagreed, 
stating that the parol evidence rule does not apply where a contract has 
been formed as a result of misrepresentation or mutual mistake. 182  It 
further stated that: [Where a party offered parol evidence] to show that 
the parties did not intend that the [contract] had the meaning the [other 
                                                                                                                       
motor vehicle at the advertised price while the vehicle remains unsold.  Id. at 706. 
 175. See, e.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375, 376 (1864).  In Raffles, the parties 
entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of cotton scheduled to arrive on the ship Peerless.  
Id. at 375.  Unknown to the parties, there were two ships named Peerless, and the parties were not 
referring to the same one.  Id.  See also Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 130, at 310 n.2 (noting that 
cases involving misunderstandings are void rather than voidable). 
 176. 37 P.3d 411 (Alaska 2001). 
 177. Id. at 413. 
 178. Id. at 416. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 417 n.14. 
 182. Id. (quoting Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 991 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Alaska 1999)). 
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party] ascribed to it, not to vary or contradict the terms of the written 
contract . . . this was a permissible use of extrinsic evidence to prove 
mutual mistake.183 
While the court analyzed the issue as a misunderstanding, it referred 
to the basis for non-enforcement as mutual mistake, stating that 
although a party may avoid a contract based on mistake or 
misrepresentation regarding the contracts meaning, the party loses 
power to avoid the contract, if, after he knows or has reason to know 
of the mistake or non-fraudulent misrepresentation . . . he manifests to 
the other party his intention to affirm it . . . .184 
If, however, the facts were as alleged, there was no mutual mistake 
because there was no shared mistaken basic assumption.  Rather, there 
was a fundamental misunderstanding and therefore, no meeting of the 
minds, and no contract at all.185  While the court erred with respect to 
what to label the basis for contract avoidance, it made clear that the 
relevant substantive issue was determining the parties intent.186  If one 
party did not understand gross receipts to mean what the other party 
meant, then the contract could be avoided because the party did not have 
the cognitive intent to enter into the transaction that the other party 
contemplated.187 
Not only do courts mislabel misunderstandings as mutual mistakes 
(and vice versa), courts often stumble on the interpretive issues 
associated with misunderstandings.  In City of Everett v. Estate of 
Oddmund Sumstad, the buyers purchased at an auction a used safe with a 
locked compartment for fifty dollars.188  It was later discovered that the 
locked compartment contained $32,207.189  The Supreme Court of 
                                                     
 183. Id. (citing Philbin, 991 P.2d at 1270). 
 184. Id. at 418. 
 185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.  But cf. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING 
MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS 1415 (2004) (noting that the 
Peerless case was a rare exception and that the mere fact that a party has a different perception of 
the others understanding of the meaning of their language does not prevent a contract from 
arising.)  A court will almost invariably apply an objective standard and find that the meaning of 
the language accords with the understanding of one or the other of the parties.  Id. at 1415.  Keith 
Rowley disagrees, stating that Farnsworth overgeneralized in writing that a misunderstanding will 
not prevent contract formation.  In fact, a mutual misunderstanding will prevent contract formation.  
Keith Rowley, To Err Is Human, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1407, 1411 (2006) (reviewing E. ALLEN 
FARNSWORTH, ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS 
(2004)). 
 186. See Krossa, 37 P.3d at 416 (describing the requirements of a valid contract). 
 187. Id. 
 188. 631 P.2d 366, 367 (Wash. 1981). 
 189. Id. 
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Washington stated that Washington contract law was governed by an 
objective theory, which lays stress on the outward manifestation of 
assent made by each party to the other.  The subjective intention of the 
parties is irrelevant.190  The court further added that a partys intent 
must be imputed corresponding to the reasonable meaning of a persons 
words and acts.191  Yet, in distinguishing the case before it from West 
Coast Airlines, Inc. v. Miners Aircraft & Engine Service, Inc.,192 the 
court seemed to confuse objective from subjective intent: 
In West Coast Airlines, the aircraft engines were clearly not intended to 
be sold to Junk Traders.  The inclusion of the engines in the sale of 
scrap metal was inadvertent and wholly unknown to both parties.  
Neither party was aware the sealed containers might hold anything 
other than scrap metal.  Furthermore, West Coast Airlines retained the 
Federal documents that must be transferred to the purchaser upon the 
sale of an aircraft engine, a clear indication it did not intend to pass title 
to the engines.193 
West Coast Airlines outward manifestation, as viewed by a 
reasonable person, indicates that it did, in fact, intend to sell the sealed 
containers containing the engines.  The court differentiated the case 
before it by stating that the auctioneer had told the bidders that the safe 
had come from an estate, that the safe was locked, and that the contents 
of the safe had not been opened by the auctioneer.194  Yet, an 
acknowledgment by the auctioneer that the safe has not been opened is 
not the same as agreeing to sell for fifty dollars a safe containing over 
thirty thousand dollars. 
The distinction between City of Everett v. Estate of Oddmund 
Sumstad and West Coast Airlines, Inc. v. Miners Aircraft & Engine 
Service, Inc. is not that in one case the party objectively manifested 
assent, and in the other it did not.  In both cases, the seller objectively 
manifested assent to the sale, but the seller in West Coast Airlines lacked 
both the cognitive intent and contextual purposive intent to enter into the 
actual transaction.  Not only was the seller in West Coast Airlines 
unaware that the sealed containers held aircraft engines, the seller did not 
even consider the possibility that it might contain something other than 
scrap material.195  Furthermore, the sellers contextual purposive intent in 
                                                     
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. 403 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1965). 
 193. Estate of Oddmund Sumstad, 631 P.2d at 368. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See West Coast Airlines, 403 P.2d at 835 (discussing the circumstances of the sale). 
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selling the scrap metal was both to earn money and to rid its premises of 
junknot to get rid of airplane engines.  By contrast, in Estate of 
Oddmund Sumstad, the seller (through the auctioneer) made explicit that 
he was assuming the risk that the safe might contain something more 
valuable than the auction price.  In fact, it was precisely that unknown 
value that the buyers were bidding uponnot the market value of the 
safe or even the unknown contents of the safe.  The sellers were not 
agreeing to sell a safe containing $30,000they were agreeing to sell a 
safe that might contain something valuable within but just as likely might 
contain nothing.  Both parties were aware of the possibility that the safe 
might contain something valuable and each was capitalizing on that 
possibility in the way that he thought bestthe seller, in the hopes of 
getting a higher bid price, and the buyer, in the hopes of discovering a 
hidden treasure.  While the seller did not know for certain that the safe 
contained money, he had expressly considered the possibility that it 
might.  While the seller may have lacked actual knowledge of the safes 
contents, he had the cognitive intent to enter into the transaction.  The 
sellers contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was to 
auction the safe at the highest price possible, both to benefit financially 
as well as to disencumber himself from the item.  Both of these 
objectives were metthe seller accepted the highest price and no longer 
had to store the safe.  The contextual purposive intent of the seller was 
not defeated simply because he subsequently discovered that he might 
have received a higher price if he had known about the hidden money. 
B. Changed Circumstances 
Sometimes, a party seeks to avoid a contract as a result of a basic 
assumption error regarding the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of a 
condition subsequent to contract formation.  In Taylor v. Caldwell 
(which has been recognized as the first case involving impossibility as a 
defense196) the court established the rule that if the existence of a 
particular thing is necessary for a partys performance, then if such thing 
is destroyed, the partys performance under the contract is excused.197  In 
that case, the parties entered into a contract whereby Taylor was to use 
Caldwells music hall for performances on four days, in return for 
payment of £100 per day.198  The music hall was accidentally destroyed 
                                                     
 196. Gordley, supra note 6, at 521. 
 197. 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 314 (K.B. 1863) (cited in FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.5). 
 198. Id. 
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by fire less than a week before the first performance.199  Taylor sued 
Caldwell for breach of contract, claiming damages incurred in 
preparation of the performances.200  The court decided that the continued 
existence of the music hall was an implied condition of the contract and, 
because the music hall was destroyed, Caldwells performance was 
excused.201 
The implied condition was a tacit assumption of the parties.  The 
invalidity of the parties tacit assumption reveals an absence of cognitive 
intent for both Taylor and Caldwell.  Caldwell would not have agreed to 
rent out the music hall, and Taylor would not have agreed to rent it, if 
either had known the hall would be destroyed by fire.  Furthermore, each 
party lacked contextual purposive intent to enter into the actual contract 
because the fire destroyed both parties ability to perform.  In other 
words, Caldwell never had the intent to enter into an agreement that 
required him to deliver possession of a non-existent structure, or one that 
needed to be entirely rebuilt.  Similarly, Taylor lacked contextual 
purposive intent to enter into the contract because he wanted to rent the 
premises to stage music performancessomething he could no longer do 
after the fire.  He lacked contextual purposive intent because an event 
subsequent to the formation of the contractthe firedestroyed his 
reason for renting the premises.  The same circumstancesthe fire and 
the subsequent destruction of the music halldefeated the contractual 
intent of both parties.  Yet, if Caldwell were to sue Taylor for breach of 
contract (assuming that there was no provision in the contract specifying 
the condition in which the music hall would be delivered), Taylor 
would not be able to use impossibility as a defense to the contract.  
Instead, he would have to resort to the doctrine of frustration of purpose. 
The doctrine of frustration of purpose is nearly identical to the 
doctrine of impossibility and has been referred to as its companion 
rule.202  The difference is that with the frustration of purpose doctrine, 
performance remains possible but the expected value of the 
performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by 
the supervening event.203  The third changed circumstances doctrine, 
                                                     
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., 566 N.E.2d 603, 605 (Mass. 1991). 
 203. Id. at 606 (citing Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 53 (Cal. 1944)).  See also Posner & 
Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 85 (Impossibility is the rubric used when the carrying out of a 
promise is no longer physically possible, and frustration of purpose when performance of the 
promise is physically possible but the underlying purpose of the bargain is no longer attainable.). 
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impracticability, has been referred to as a catch-all204 for situations 
where performance is physically possible but would entail a much higher 
cost than originally expected.205  As Richard Posner and Andrew 
Rosenfield have noted, [t]here is thus no functional distinction between 
impossibility and frustration cases on the one hand and impracticability 
cases on the other.206 
With all three doctrines, the central issue concerns the allocation of 
risk, independent of fault, of the event giving rise to the claim of 
impossibility, frustration of purpose,207 or impracticability.  The 
allocation of risk, however, is not always readily determinable.208  Posner 
and Rosenfield have argued that a party should bear the risk if he or she 
is in a better position than the other party to foresee the risk, insure 
against it, or prevent the risk from occurring.209  James Gordley, on the 
other hand, observes that while foreseeability is helpful to explain the 
result in some contexts, it is not so helpful in others, such as war, where 
neither party could have foreseen the intervening event.210  In those 
situations, Gordley observes, the results seem related to the degree to 
which a party could have controlled the event that made performance 
impossible.211  Thus, control matters because the party in control could 
have decreased the risk by taking reasonable precautions.212 
The solution promoted under the Uniform Commercial Code213 and 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts214 is that performance may be 
excused if it was premised upon a basic assumption that was false.  
U.C.C. section 2-615 states: 
                                                     
 204. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86. 
 205. Id.  The doctrine of commercial impracticability is believed to have first appeared in 
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458 (Cal. 1916).  See Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of 
the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for the Wisdom of Solomon, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1123, 1132 (1987). 
 206. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86.  In his article, Kull similarly uses the word 
frustration to encompass all the doctrines of frustration of purpose, impracticability, and 
impossibility.  See Kull, supra note 6, at 1 n.1. 
 207. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86.  See also Gordley, supra note 6, at 524. 
 208. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 86. 
 209. Id. at 90.  See also Gordley, supra note 6, at 524. 
But see Kull, supra note 6, at 47 (Superior risk-bearing capacity as determined after the fact by 
judges is therefore a default term that conveys no usable information to the parties; and an 
uninformative default term cannot be the source of any economies from superior risk spreading.). 
 210. Gordley, supra note 6, at 524. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1998). 
 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). 
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Except so far as a seller may have assumed a greater obligation . . . (a) 
Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller . . . is 
not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as 
agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency 
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the 
contract was made . . . .215 
The doctrine of commercial impracticability, unlike the common law 
doctrine of impossibility, expressly recognizes that fault should be 
relevant to risk allocation and that in certain cases justice requires a 
departure from the general rule that a promisor bears the risk of increased 
difficulty of performance.216  The avoiding party must meet four 
requirements.  First, the avoiding party must show that the occurrence of 
the event made performance as agreed . . . impracticable.217  If the 
agreement gives the party seeking avoidance a choice between 
alternative ways of performing, the impracticability of performing one of 
these alternatives does not excuse performance if another alternative 
remains open.218  Second, the nonoccurrence of the condition must have 
been a basic assumption on which the contract was made.219  As 
Gordley notes, [t]o ask on what basic assumptions a contract was based 
is not much different than asking . . . on what implied conditions it was 
made.220  Whether the nonoccurrence was in fact a basic contract 
assumption is thus a question of foreseeability.221  Market fluctuations, 
for example, are usually foreseeable.222  Third, the avoiding party must 
not be at fault by, for example, acting negligently.223  Finally, the party 
seeking avoidance must not have contractually assumed a greater 
obligation than that imposed by law.224 
                                                     
 215. Although section 2-615 expressly applies to commercial sellers, it has been interpreted by 
some courts to include buyers as well.  See, e.g., Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 
P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 1985) (stating that the provisions of U.C.C. section 2-615 are applicable to 
buyers as long as there is compliance with the statutory requirements). 
 216. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.6. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Gordley, supra note 6, at 525. 
 221. Lawrance v. Elmore Bean Warehouse, Inc., 702 P.2d 930, 932 (Idaho 1985). 
 222. The accompanying comment explains that [i]ncreased cost alone does not excuse 
performance unless the rise in cost is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential 
nature of the performance.  Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself a justification, for 
that is exactly the type of business risk which business contracts made at fixed prices are intended to 
cover.  U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4 (1998). 
 223. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 9.6. 
 224. Id. 
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As several scholars have noted, the focus on foreseeability misses 
the point and unnecessarily restricts the impracticability doctrine.225  
Whether an event is foreseeable does not necessarily correlate with what 
the parties intended, and silence does not necessarily mean that the party 
seeking avoidance intended to assume the risk.226  I submit that all three 
changed circumstances doctrines provide for excuse in the absence of 
contextual purposive intent.  For example, in Taylor v. Caldwell, 
Caldwell entered into the agreement assuming the continued existence of 
the music hall.  He lacked cognitive intent because he failed to consider 
the possibility of a fire, and he lacked contextual purposive intent to 
enter into the contract as the circumstances turned out to be. 
Contextual purposive intent requires judicial consideration of the 
circumstances of the transaction both before and after the time of 
contract formation.  A consideration of context requires taking into 
account trade norms unless a contrary subjective understanding can be 
credibly proven.  In Taylor v. Caldwell, the court decided in Caldwells 
favor.  If, however, the case were to arise today, given the prevalence 
and customary nature of landowners insuring against fire damage, the 
result might be different.  Caldwell would likely have considered the 
possibility of fire (thus, cognitive intent would exist).  In addition, it has 
become customary, at least in the United States, for landowners to carry 
fire insurance on their properties.  The existence of an industry norm 
partially determines context.  The courts have established such a norm in 
contractor cases.  Where a contractor has been hired to construct a 
structure, the destruction of that structure by fire or otherwise will not 
excuse the contractors performance.  If, however, the contractor has 
been hired to build an addition to an existing structure, destruction of that 
existing structure will excuse the contractors performance.  The 
underlying rationale for distinguishing these two types of situations 
hinges upon the fact that in the latter situation, the landowner is in a 
better position than the contractor to insure against destruction of the 
structure (whereas the contractor is in a better position to prevent damage 
and insure against destruction of a new structure).  The Uniform 
                                                     
 225. John H. Stroh, The Failure of the Doctrine of Impracticability, 5 CORP. L. REV. 195, 216 
(1982) (noting that the difficulty with foreseeability is that it ignores the how and why 
businessmen contract); George Wallach, The Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial 
Frustration of the U.C.C. Attempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 203, 20407 (1979). 
 226. Stephen J. Sirianni, The Developing Law of Contractual Impracticability and Impossibility: 
Part I, 14 UCC L.J. 30, 65 (1981) (stating that to foresee a risk is not the same as allocating that 
risk); Wallach, supra note 225 at 21415 (noting that parties often are unable to agree on an 
allocation even where a contingency is foreseeable). 
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Commercial Code also considers insurance in the context of risk of loss, 
although it does so rather coyly.227 
IV. EXPECTED ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED DYNAMIC 
APPROACH/EXPANDED INTENT ANALYSIS 
A. Argument #1: Subjective Intent Is Impossible to Determine 
Some may object that discerning subjective intent is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible.228  This objection ignores that the issue of 
subjective intent already exists in contract disputes, both in defenses229 
and interpretation issues.230  In fact, focusing on subjective rather than 
objective intent is more consistent with the underlying will theory of 
contract law.  Furthermore, it reflects the position adopted by the 
Uniform Commercial Code.231  The real world issue will be one of 
credibility.  In most cases, the courts will assume that the parties 
intended what reasonable contracting parties would have intended.232  If, 
                                                     
 227. U.C.C. § 2-510 (1998) (putting risk of loss on the breaching party to the extent that the non-
breaching partys insurance fails to cover the loss). 
 228. James Gordley notes that nearly all modern jurists agree that an error in motive does not 
warrant relief.  See Gordley, supra note 36, at 435. 
 229. See, e.g., Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 n.2 (2d Cir. 1941) 
(declaring that the court reached the outcome the parties would have intended if they had foreseen 
the present contingency). 
 230. Halpern, supra note 205, at 1127 (noting that the fictions used by the court in impossibility 
cases are essentially the same tools that are applied to other questions of contract interpretation and 
enforcement).  Edward Imwinkelried suggests that interpretative intention or the intention that a 
person probably would have formed if he or she had foreseen the circumstances that came to pass, 
should be employed by judges in interpreting (outdated) legislation.  Edward J. Imwinkelried, A 
More Modest Proposal than a Common Law for the Age of Statutes: Greater Reliance in Statutory 
Interpretation on the Concept of Interpretative Intention, 68 ALB. L. REV. 949, 953 (2005).  But see 
Rasmusen & Ayres, supra note 130, at 309 (Reforming or voiding contracts . . . goes beyond the 
gap-filling function in which courts customarily engage; it is an almost paternalistic change in the 
contracts express terms.  Hence, contract law must be very careful how it treats mistake.). 
 231. Many commentators view the Codes adoption of the shared basic assumption test as a 
departure from the fiction of objective intent to an analysis that takes into account subjective intent.  
For instance, Halpern states that the Codes shift would result in the concept of foreseeability 
giving way to a new behavioral analysis with the inquiry focused on what the parties actually 
contemplated.  Halpern, supra note 205, at 1147.  Yet, he argues that the Codes subjective search 
for actual intent has not in fact displaced the centrality of objective foreseeability by courts.  Id. at 
1148.  Halpern, however, states that if we dislike the concept of foreseeability, we might better ask 
whether intent, subjectively or objectively determined, is an appropriate or even relevant 
consideration in allocating the risks of seriously disruptive events and whether there are any 
workable alternatives.  Id. at 1154.  This Article, on the other hand, suggests that intent is highly 
relevant; it must, however, be balanced against policy considerations. 
 232. See GROVER C. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 253 (John Edward 
Murray, Jr., rev. ed. 1965) (What we are really doing is imposing an obligation which the party 
obligated, were he a reasonable man, probably would have been willing to assume, had the question 
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however, there is credible evidence that demonstrates a contrary intent, 
that finding of actual intent should trump the hypothetical, objective 
intent.  The evidentiary bar for the avoiding party is noteworthy given 
the requirement of good faith, for the avoiding party must convince the 
judge that she is telling the truth when she claims that although she acted 
unreasonably, she acted honestly with respect to her intention in entering 
into the agreement. 
B. Argument #2: Courts Should Not Make Policy 
Another concern likely to be raised is legislating from the bench.  
This concern is most salient in connection with the consideration of 
contextual purposive intent, which considers policy issues such as 
economic efficiency and fairness.  Yet, the basic assumption defenses 
currently existing already consider policy.233  In fact, to the extent that a 
legislative body has adopted the UCC, a refusal to incorporate these 
policy objectives undermines legislative authority and is itself judicial 
legislation.234  This Article does not promote any new policies in 
connection with existing basic assumption defenses.  What it does 
advocate is the separation of the two central concerns addressed by 
existing basic assumption defenses.  In each defense, there is an intent 
inquiry regarding the parties contractual purpose.235  Currently, mistake 
defenses limit that inquiry to the facts at the time of contract formation, 
while changed circumstances doctrines consider facts arising after 
contract formation.236  More importantly, however, formalistic 
constraints subvert the underlying purpose of contract law.  We infer 
intent from actions, and context gives meaning to actions.  To require 
performance where circumstances have undermined contextual purposive 
intent is to ignore the very reason why we enforce contracts.237  To 
illustrate this on a very basic level, imagine that a parent makes a 
promise to her child that they will go swimming later in the day.  The 
child falls asleep in the car and does not awaken until several hours later 
                                                                                                                       
presented itself when the contract was made.). 
 233. See Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 747, 757 (discussing fairness and efficiency as the basis for 
the bargain theory and principles of unconscionability). 
 234. George Wallach has argued that courts have adhered to the common law standards for 
excuse and have ignored the UCC drafters intent to liberalize those standards, making the 
successful use of commercial impracticability as a defense difficult, if not impossible.  See Wallach, 
supra note 225, at 203, 218. 
 235. See supra Part III. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 1624 (stating that a literalist approach undermines the 
purpose of contract law). 
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when it is dinnertime.  A very young or very manipulative child will 
insist that the parent adhere to her promise.  A more mature or less 
manipulative child will understand that the circumstances warrant a 
change in plans, and that there will be no swimming that day.  That child 
may feel disappointed, but he will understand the reason that the promise 
must be broken.  The moral obligation to keep a promise does not always 
override every other obligation, moral or otherwise, and not every broken 
promise is immoral.238  Like the mature child, a more developed legal 
system would recognize that, sometimes, context changes the meaning of 
words. 
C. Argument #3: A Dynamic Approach Is Unfair 
Some may ask, what about the other party, the non-avoiding party?  
Should his interests not be protected?  The answer is that the other 
partys interests are considered at each step of the proposed intent 
analysis.  Volitional intent takes into account socially unacceptable 
behavior on the part of the other party, such as the making of threats or 
the use of intimidation, which does not so much protect the non-avoiding 
partys interest as discern whether it is worth protecting at all.  Cognitive 
intent analysis requires asking whether the parties discussed or 
considered the facts giving rise to the request for avoidance.  Contextual 
purposive intent considers trade norms and fairness issues, such as the 
existence or availability of insurance.239  Finally, even where one or more 
facets of intent may be lacking, the contract may yet be enforced if the 
societal interest in the security of transactions is great enough, such as 
where both parties have fully performed, where there is reliance,240 or 
where the market is inherently speculative.241 
                                                     
 238. Mel Eisenberg discusses this point with respect to mistakes: Some types of mistake 
provide a moral justification for not keeping a promise.  Correspondingly, a promisee may act badly 
if she insists on full performance even after she has been made aware of such a mistake.  Eisenberg, 
supra note 51, at 1579.  He further states that in some cases, two moral norms may conflict: 
[f]or example, the moral norm dont lie is not inconsistent with the moral norm 
venerate human life, even though under certain circumstances venerating human life 
might require lyingas in lying to an assassin about his victims whereabouts.  It does 
not lessen our commitment to truth-telling that we believe it is sometimes morally 
permissible not to tell the truth. 
Id. at 1581. 
 239. See Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1978) (noting that insurance is often the only effective means of risk reduction); 
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 8, at 91. 
 240. The reliance would also have to be in good faith. 
 241. For example, because of the difficulty, even impossibility, of establishing authenticity or 
establishing pricing for art, invalidating contracts where there was a failure of cognitive intent may 
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An expanded intent analysis streamlines the current regime of 
contract defenses, which is generally agreed to be inexact at best, and 
incoherent at worst.  It erases the artificial distinctions inherent in the 
doctrinal categories (such as the timing of the discovery of the excusing 
condition) to focus on what courts tend to focus on anywaycontractual 
intent.  It is flexible enough to accommodate evolving business and 
social norms.  In particular, the Internet has provided a useful new 
medium by which to conduct transactions while its very widespread 
availability and accessibility create more opportunities for basic 
assumption errors. 
Let us return to the hypothetical Internet homebuyer presented at the 
beginning of this Article.  Our homebuyer purchased her home after 
viewing several attractive pictures that accurately reflected the homes 
condition.  They did not, however, reveal something of great importance 
to the homebuyer.  She lacked the cognitive intent to enter into the 
transaction because she did not know about the noise from the nearby 
road.  Her contextual purposive intent in entering into the transaction was 
to purchase a home that provided peace and tranquility.  Under my 
proposed intent analysis, she should therefore be permitted to avoid the 
agreement provided that it is not offset by the societal interest in the 
security of transaction.  If, for example, she had not discovered the noisy 
road until she had moved into the house, she should not be allowed to 
avoid the agreement.  This expanded intent analysis thus reflects 
something more than legal obligationsit reflects the way people 
actually conduct business. 242  Merchants are not required to refund 
conforming purchases to unhappy customers,243 but many do anyway and 
claim satisfaction or your money back, no questions asked.  Permitting 
avoidance would also encourage fuller disclosure by Internet sellers.  
Existing law generally does not impose a duty to disclose; yet imposing 
upon the purchaser the same standards of investigation as those existing 
prior to the advent of the Internet diminishes many of the advantages of  
conducting business online, such as reduced travel expenses.  Allowing 
the purchaser to avoid a contract where there is a lack of cognitive intent 
would prompt Internet sellers to provide a more accurate description of 
their wares.  If we accept that the Internet confers a benefit on the 
                                                                                                                       
cause a chain of contracts [to] fall like dominos as far back as the available evidence will go. See 
Gordley, supra note 36, at 455. 
 242. This hypothetical is based on an actual situation where the buyer was able to get out of the 
purchase.  See Tim Neville, Buying a Second Home Without a First Look, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, 
at F6.  See also Elizabeth Rhodes, Buyers New Buddy, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 5, 2006, at G1. 
 243. The U.C.C. requires merchants to provide a remedy for nonconforming merchandise unless 
expressly and conspicuously disclaimed.  See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -316 (1998). 
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economy and societybecause it promotes the contract law objective of 
economic efficiency by providing an accessible marketplace where more 
private parties can allocate resources to a higher valued use244we 
should also acknowledge and accommodate the paradigmatic shift it has 
created in the way contracts are formed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contract law has historically acknowledged the importance of the 
intent of the parties in contract interpretation and enforcement.  Yet, the 
meaning of intent has been left unexamined.  Basic assumption 
defenses exemplify the dynamic nature of neoclassical contract law.  
Dynamic contract law first effectuates the objectives of the contracting 
parties and then considers any policy constraints on those objectives.245  
In order for contract law to be truly dynamic, however, both parts of the 
analysis must be dynamic and contextualized.  An evaluation of policy 
considerations is, by its nature, dynamic and contextualized as it takes 
into account societal needs at the time and place of dispute resolution.  
Traditionally, consideration of contractual intent, although somewhat 
contextual, is seldom dynamic.  Classical contract laws vision of intent 
is static (as opposed to dynamic) because it only considers intent as it 
exists at the time of contract formation.  A failure to examine contractual 
intent in light of events subsequent to contract formation often 
undermines the purpose of the contract.246 
Furthermore, contract laws treatment of intent is only partly 
contextual because of the continuing influence of the objective 
standard of reasonableness.  While classical contract law theoretically 
enforced contracts because the individual had assumed contractual 
liability,247 it did so by viewing the individuals actions from the 
standpoint of a reasonable person248 rather than by considering the 
                                                     
 244. Online real estate companies, for example, provide sellers with alternatives other than 
having to pay the standard real estate agent commission of 6%.  Rhodes, supra note 242.  Auction 
sites, such as eBay, exemplify the execution of value optimization by private parties. 
 245. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 23. 
 246. See supra Part III. 
 247. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 23, at 1286. 
 248. See Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 1749 (discussing the rigidity of classical contract law).  
DiMatteo has traced the roots of the reasonable person to a Greek philosophical tradition grafted 
on to Roman law by moral philosophers.  DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 305.  He further notes that 
the objectivity of contracts was historically measured by religious morality: 
In the Middle Ages the convergence of canon and secular law was embodied in the 
rediscovery of Justinians Codex, Novellae, Institutiones, and Digestae.  This was the 
genesis of the idea of the existence of an autonomous device to judge private exchanges 
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individuals subjective intent.249  Classical contract laws adoption of the 
objective theory of interpretation considered the actual, unexpressed 
intent of the parties as irrelevant.250  Instead, the courts considered the 
overt acts of the parties rather than their subjective beliefs or 
motivations.251  The modern approach, adopted by the Second 
Restatement, reflects a mix of both objective and subjective elements.252  
Under that view, language is interpreted in accordance with its generally 
                                                                                                                       
and relationships . . . .  The reasonable person can be seen as an external, autonomous 
source, much in the order of this tradition . . . . The equating of breach of promise to 
dishonesty in business combined to give to contracts a measure of religious blessedness 
and to breaches of contract a mark of sinful or unethical aberration.  The morality of 
promise was the autonomous measure to which the contract breaker was to be held . . . . 
The genesis of the reasonable person can be seen in laws religious ancestors . . . .  One 
can see the reasonable person as the embodiment of Aquinas notion of human reason. 
Id. at 30607 (citing SIR DAVID HUGHES PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 6 
(1959)). 
 249. Eisenberg, supra note 23, at 175658.  This seeming inconsistency is reflected in classical 
contract laws formalistic static and binary nature.  Id. at 1749.  Larry A. DiMatteo notes that 
[a]t first, the will theorists viewed the reasonable person standard as merely providing 
evidence of the subjective understanding of the parties . . . .  In the process of formalizing 
and generalizing the system of contract law, the legal rules came to bear a more and more 
tenuous relationship to the actual intent of the parties.  What once could be defended and 
justified as simply a more efficacious way of carrying out the parties intentions came 
eventually to be perceived as a system that subordinated and overruled the parties will. 
DiMatteo, supra note 32, at 297. 
 250. See FULLER & EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 38384 (Classical contract law adopted a 
theory of interpretation that was purely, or almost purely, objective.). 
 251. Id.  The court in Woburn National Bank v. Woods, espoused the objective theory of contract 
when it stated: 
A contract involves what is called a meeting of the minds of the parties.  But this does not 
mean that they must have arrived at a common mental state touching the manner in hand.  
The standard by which their conduct is judged and their rights are limited is not internal 
but external.  In the absence of fraud or incapacity, the question is: What did the party say 
and do?  The making of a contract does not depend upon the state of the parties minds; 
it depends upon their overt acts. 
89 A. 491, 492 (N.H. 1914). 
 252. The Restatement provides as follows: 
(1) Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning. 
(2) Where the parties have attached different meanings to a promise or agreement or a 
term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with the meaning attached by one of them if 
at the time the agreement was made 
(a) that party did not know of any different meaning attached by the other, and the 
other knew the meaning attached by the first party; or 
(b) that party had no reason to know of any different meaning attached by the other, 
and the other had reason to know the meaning attached by the first party. 
(3) Except as stated in this Section, neither party is bound by the meaning attached by the 
other, even though the result may be a failure of mutual assent. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). 
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prevailing meaning unless a different intention is shown.253  Thus, 
classical contract laws influence remains today.  The objective theory of 
contracts replaces the underlying purposes of contract law
promulgating the intent of the partieswith a normative function; the 
reasonable person is himself a norm. 
The primary objective of contract law is not, however, to standardize 
contracting behavior.  Perhaps the single most acknowledged 
justification for contract enforcement is that contracting promotes 
individual autonomy or the will of the parties.254  Yet, the parties to a 
contract are not always reasonable, or at least not reasonable as such a 
term may be understood by a decisionmaker with a different background 
and experiences.255  People, even where they are reasonable, are not 
always reasonable in the same way.  Parties often do not always share the 
same assumptions, experience, cultural or social values, bargaining 
power or access to information, either with each other or with the 
decisionmaker or hypothetical reasonable person.  Thus, even if we were 
to accept dynamic contract laws view of contractual intent as purely  
 
subjective, we must still resolve the issue of how we should analyze such 
intent. 
In this paper, I have proposed one possibility for evaluating intent 
and applied this expanded intent framework in the context of basic 
assumption defenses.  A dynamic approach to mistaken basic 
                                                     
 253. Id.  The Second Restatement expressly acknowledges that 
there are substantial differences between English and American usages and between 
usages in different parts of the United States.  Differences of usages also exist in various 
localities and in different social, economic, religious and ethnic groups.  All these usages 
change over time, and persons engaged in transactions with each other often develop 
temporary usages peculiar to themselves.  Moreover, most words are commonly used in 
more than one sense. 
Id. § 201 cmt. a. 
 254. Friedrich Kessler, Introduction: Contract as a Principle of Order, in FRIEDRICH KESSLER 
ET AL., CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1986), reprinted in A CONTRACTS ANTHOLOGY 32, 34 (Peter Linzer ed., 
2d ed. 1995); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 149 (1954).  See 
generally, FRIED, supra note 19. 
 255. See Blake Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 1, 78.  As Blake Morant notes, [I]n many controversies involving principles of contract, factors 
of race, ethnicity or gender can play a tangential, if not pivotal, role in the formation and 
adjudication of many binding obligations.  Id.  He further notes,  
[t]he contextual circumstances presented by notable contract decisions [such as Williams 
v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co. and Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.] compel a 
readjustment of contract pedagogy and demand a more probative analysis of bargaining 
relationships.  Thus, factors of racial or gender bias command attention, particularly 
when they can impact the formation or judicial interpretation of agreements.   
Id. 
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assumption-type situations (which would replace existing defenses) 
would apply expanded intent analysis first, and then consider whether the 
societal interest in the security of transactions compels enforcement 
notwithstanding the absence of one or more facets of intent.  By 
eliminating the doctrinal categories, a dynamic approach streamlines 
analysis of cases where what the parties bargained for is very different 
from what they received.  Dynamic contract law strives to effectuate the 
underlying objectives of contract law, rather than merely adhering to the 
rules that implement those objectives.  Finally, a dynamic approach is 
adaptive and accommodates changes in contracting culture brought about 
by technological advancements and globalization.256 
 
 
                                                     
 256. See generally Kim, supra note 23. 
